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Abstract
In the late 1990s, the Air Force eliminated over 200 KC-135 navigators, leaving
50 remaining for the aircraft’s most complex Special Operations Air Refueling (SOAR)
mission. As the Air Force unveils the KC-46 Pegasus, this mission will continue but
without a position for the navigator. Instead, navigators will undergo divestment as the
SOAR mission transfers to the KC-46. Current plans indicate navigators will not only
remain as the KC-46 arrives, but inbound navigators will continue arriving until 2018.
This thesis applies the Delphi method, a process eliciting analysis anonymously from a
panel of experts, in order to examine the elements affecting KC-135 navigator divestment
and offer a more effective, comprehensive solution. Ultimately, the panel of experts
arrived at conclusions supporting the hypothesis that navigator divestment and SOAR
transition should occur sooner, rather than later, in order to secure a future for current
navigators, ensure responsible development of Air Force officers, and enable the complex
SOAR mission to endure. In order to best achieve these results, the experts
recommended halting all inbound navigator assignments, reassigning navigators at a
conservative rate over the next several years, and beginning a SOAR transition program
to replace the tanker navigator with a third pilot concept.
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PRAGMATIC DIVESTMENT OF KC-135 NAVIGATORS IN THE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR REFUELING MISSION

I. Introduction
Background
Over the past half century, the United States Air Force made significant progress
in the advancement of warfighting capabilities for its aircraft fleet. Perhaps the most
substantial innovation was the development of the Global Positioning System (GPS).
The application of the GPS to triangulate aircraft position increased navigation precision
and, over time, contributed to a decreased need for the navigator crew position on many
aircraft. In fact, this decreased navigator need, teamed with an increasingly antiquated
training program, prevented many navigators from reaching their full career potential.
Therefore, in 2004 the Air Force transformed the navigator role into the Combat Systems
Officer (CSO) and created a modernized training program which enabled more crew
integration and the ability to operate complex systems (Chapman 2005).
Navigators on the KC-135 Stratotanker realize the effects of avionics
advancement and the decreased need for their Major Weapons System (MWS) role all
too well. Between 1997 and 2001, the KC-135 was outfitted with a sophisticated upgrade
called “Pacer CRAG,” where CRAG stood for compass, radar, and GPS (Clarke 1999).
This enhancement eliminated positions for navigators on all but the most complex
missions, and 203 of the originally funded 254 aviators were removed between 1996 and
2000 (Deivert 1994). The disheartening aspect of this reduction involved an assignment
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system which could not handle reallocation of over 200 navigators in such a short time.
Consequently, most of these officers were eliminated from the Air Force entirely.
The navigators which remained on the KC-135 after the completion of the
transition to primarily three-person crews in 2001 were specifically retained to fly Special
Operations Air Refueling (SOAR) missions. These missions were considered the most
complicated and demanding on the crew, necessitating the fourth crew member.
However, even at the end of the Pacer CRAG upgrade, the need for a navigator on these
SOAR missions was scrutinized. According to Major Robert Deivert, a global mobility
expert, this additional manpower could be another pilot, boom operator, or even a flight
engineer (1994).
Today, the Air Force is again revisiting the question of what to do with KC-135
navigators. The replacement to the Stratotanker, the KC-46 Pegasus, is scheduled for
delivery in 2017 and is not retrofitted with a navigator suite (2013, Aviation). This thesis
will discuss some feasibility studies with respect to the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)
options to replace the navigator. However, Air Force leadership currently proposes a
third pilot construct to perform the role and fulfill SOAR duties on the new aircraft.
Additionally, present plans involve delaying the divestment of KC-135 navigators and
transition of the SOAR mission until KC-46 delivery.
Problem Statement
According to Colonel Michael Bauer, Chief of Air Mobility Command’s Combat
Operations Division, current SOAR transition plans necessitate inflow of CSOs from
Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training (SUNT) according to Table 1 below.
2

Table 1. Inbound Navigator Manning Pipeline
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Fiscal Year

10

Number of Inbound Navigators

10

10

5

0

This plan was designed to parallel the transition of the KC-135 to the KC-46, a beddown
with a Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) and Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) schedule
depicted in Table 2 below (AMC PPLAN 14-01 2014).
Table 2. McConnell AFB KC-135 Drawdown/KC-46A Beddown Schedule PAI/BAI
Type

FQ1/16

FQ2/16

FQ3/16

FQ4/16

FQ1/17

FQ2/17

FQ3/17

FQ4/17

KC-135

44/11

40/11

36/11

36/7

36/7

32/5

28/3

24/3

KC-46

0

3/0

5/0

7/0

10/0

14/0

18/0

21/0

FQ1/18

FQ2/18

FQ3/18

FQ4/18

FQ1/19

FQ2/19

FQ3/19

FQ4/19

KC-135

24/3

24/3

18/4

12/5

12/5

12/2

12/2

12/2

KC-46

24/0

24/0

24/0

24/0

28/0

32/0

36/0

36/1

Type

While this proposal is achievable, it generates an unnecessary amount of risk by
assuming KC-46 aircraft will not encounter problems absorbing the SOAR mission.
According to AMC PPLAN 14-01, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) will
not commence until the third fiscal quarter of 2016 (2014). This permits only a short
window to determine and correct any incompatibilities between the KC-46’s
communications suite and required SOAR Command and Control (C2) equipment.
Additionally, these schedules pose manpower and career development concerns by
sending young navigators into terminating jobs at a time when they most need to develop

3

airmanship skills. Lastly, since inbound navigators are scheduled through 2017 and
KC-46 beddown is scheduled to complete in 2019, the proposed timeline suggests the Air
Force Personnel Command’s (AFPC) assignment system will again find itself flooded
with a large number of KC-135 navigators in a short period of time. Based on the Air
Force’s decision to eliminate over 200 navigators in the late 1990s, history suggests the
assignment system cannot handle such a demand efficiently.
Research Questions
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question, “What is the best manner in
which to handle the divestment of KC-135 navigators and the transition of the SOAR
mission?” In order to refine AMC’s current transition plan, it is necessary to examine the
problem from several vantage points using a systems approach and examine multiple
courses of action to effectively and efficiently remove navigators from the KC-135
SOAR mission while minimizing costs. The resulting recommendation must deliver a
cradle to grave Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) blueprint for the elimination
of KC-135 navigators, as well as a training program for an additional SOAR crew
member. In light of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) shrinking budget, these plans
must underscore cost savings in the Air Force’s best interests.
Investigative Questions
In order to meet these research objectives, several questions must be explored.
These investigative questions consider SOAR transition ramifications from many angles,
including Air Force Instruction (AFI) revisions, personnel and training costs, Unit
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Manning Document (UMD) updates, navigator career implications, who should absorb
the navigator’s existing duties, and how training should be handled. Table 3 lists the
questions which must be researched in order to present a comprehensive navigator
divestment and SOAR transition plan.
Table 3. Investigative Questions
# Question
1 How should navigators be divested from the KC-135?
2 What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects after navigators are
phased out?
3 What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the SOAR mission? What are
the cost implications?
4 What changes are required to Air Force regulations to transition the SOAR mission?
5 How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be restructured to support the
new SOAR construct?
6 How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR certified?
7 How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators from various year groups?
Where will they go? How will they accrue gate months?
Methodology Overview
In order to obtain sufficient information to address the aforementioned
investigative questions, the Delphi Process will be employed. Much of the research
identifying AMC’s current transition plan relies on interviewing key staff personnel to
obtain information. Based on a series of sequential questionnaires delivered to these
experts independently, the Delphi methodology will elicit information and expert
opinions to draw group conclusions without the burden of group think. The Delphi
technique “eliminates committee activity altogether, thus further reducing the influence
of certain psychological factors, such as specious persuasion, the unwillingness to
abandon publicly expressed opinions, and the bandwagon effect of majority opinion.
This technique replaces direct debate by a carefully designed program of sequential
5

individual interrogations (best conducted with questionnaires) interspersed with
information and opinion feedback derived by computed consensus from the earlier parts
of the program” (Brown 1968). Additionally, anonymity of experts in this research is
vital to obtain objective analysis without bias due to military rank, position, experience
level, or reputation. Due to the nature of this research and forecasting involved, the
Delphi Process is the best method to elicit valuable insight and arrive at a conclusion.
Hypothesis
The results of this research may suggest halting the inbound pipeline of navigators
to the KC-135, expediting conversion of the SOAR mission to a certified third pilot
operator construct, and reassigning navigators through normal attrition. The elimination
of navigators may require manpower reorganization involving decreasing the number of
KC-135 squadrons qualified in the SOAR mission from four to three. While it is not
expected to encounter problems training navigator replacements and changing applicable
regulations and AFIs, the most challenging aspect of the anticipated outcome will most
likely involve where to send current KC-135 navigators in order to satisfy normal career
progression, meet aviation service requirements, and maximize utility given the Air
Force’s significant training investments. Lastly, since it is expected the vast majority of
the SOAR mission will be absorbed internally with minimal training, personnel, and
flying costs, there will be a significant cost savings from eliminating navigators sooner,
rather than according to AMC’s proposed timeline.
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Assumptions/Limitations
AMC’s transition plan for the SOAR mission is closely tied to the transition of the
KC-135 to the beddown of its replacement, the KC-46. While there are significant
matters to investigate regarding SOAR capabilities on the KC-46, this thesis is scoped to
examine SOAR transition and navigator divestment independent of KC-46 changeover.
The only way this research relates to the KC-46 is to illustrate the potential risk
mitigation of shifting the SOAR mission to a non-navigator operator prior to KC-46
delivery, rather than at the same time.
Other limitations on this research involve restricted access to classified SOAR
documents and limited access to privileged information outside of the author’s leadership
chain. Such information includes, but is not limited to, detailed manpower projections
and force reduction data from AFPC, assignment system impacts of Air Staff strategic
decisions like potential U-28 and MC-130P phase-outs, and already programmed
budgetary decisions including annual funding for SUNT trainees. While arguments are
based on the best available and accessible data, it is possible other factors exist which
inform AMC Staff plans and decisions.
Expected Contributions
The conclusions of this thesis are intended to shape the body of knowledge
relating to force management of aircrew personnel in the Air Force. History reveals the
Air Force has struggled with large-scale manpower decisions, typically spending
significant amounts of money both reducing and increasing the size of the force. Too
often, the increases have been too aggressive and the reductions too severe (Kitfield
7

2012). The waves created by these actions cause significant problems for aircrew and are
extremely inefficient, especially considering the substantial training investment for pilots
and navigators.
From a training standpoint, the Air Force will always require a certain number of
instructors to train the inbound student pipeline. When that instructor corps is cut, the
void is filled by younger, less experienced aircrew. Therefore, more risk is accepted, and
the force is eventually hollowed. Aside from these training implications, however, it is
also important to consider the inefficiency of cutting fully trained and developed aviators
and replacing them with new trainees. The results of this thesis are intended to address
these possible inefficiencies by determining whether waste exists in the KC-135’s
proposed SOAR transition plan and if so, to suggest an alternative approach which more
robustly and resourcefully meets the Air Force’s needs.
Preview of Thesis
This thesis begins by investigating current manpower, personnel, and training
research, the future of the Air Force CSO, and historical KC-135 manning reductions in
the Chapter II Literature Review. This review will lay out background information and a
framework which informs research analysis. After exploring the current body of
knowledge relating to the thesis topic, Chapter III will discuss how the overall research
question and investigative questions will be answered, including who will replace KC135 navigators, how they will be replaced, and where they will go. Using those Chapter
III methodologies, the research questions will be thoroughly evaluated in Chapter IV’s
analysis and results. Finally, after carefully piecing together the thesis results, Chapter V
8

will offer the author’s comprehensive plan for the divestment of KC-135 navigators and
transition of the SOAR mission. This conclusion will judiciously assess AMC’s current
proposals and assert the author’s findings for the best way forward in the interests of the
Air Force.

9

II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the current body of knowledge in
academic literature related to the divestment of aircrew from a MWS. Since this thesis is
comprehensively scoped to examine manpower divestment, skillset transition, and officer
development, the literary review also encompasses a broad spectrum of topics. Included
in this chapter are data points and key findings on life cycle costs which impact
manpower decisions, risks incurred during rated aircrew divestment and skillset
reallocation, and future development opportunities for Air Force navigators.
Manpower, Personnel, and Training Life Cycle Costs
The most important factors impacting how and when to transition personnel
enduring human capital divestment are cost and mission effectiveness. While the Air
Force historically invests substantial sums of money to ensure units are always effective
in accomplishing the mission, the question during times of austerity and while balancing
priorities with scarce resources becomes “What is the acceptable level of effectiveness,
and at what cost?” While KC-135 navigators were specially trained for the unique SOAR
mission, the discussion at hand is whether the chosen navigator replacements conducting
this duty will be as effective and at what fiscal and opportunity costs to delaying
navigator divestment. The Delphi method will explore expert analysis regarding
effectiveness of navigators and their proposed third pilot replacements. However,
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previous studies and research exist which explain life cycle costs due to manpower,
personnel, and training.
According to Philbert Cole, Jr., Senior Acquisition Advisor at DynCorp
International, “Life cycle cost is the most important determinant of new aeronautical
systems acquisitions. Operating and support (O&S) costs are 40% to 60% of life cycle
cost. Manpower, personnel, and training average 65% to 75% of O&S costs” (1991).
Many think of life cycle costs as all of the infrastructure and resources required to
support the life of a weapon system but fail to realize the weapon system, in this case a
KC-135, is not just the aircraft. Integral to this system and its associated life cycle cost
are its operators whose manning and training are dependent upon numerous additional
support agencies like aircrew flight equipment, training, scheduling, and readiness
personnel. Therefore, Cole states the MPT portion of O&S life cycle cost is the largest
and most complex (1991). The elements of MPT are defined in Figure 1 below (Cole
1991).

Figure 1. MPT Defined
11

As Cole indicated, the computation of MPT is complicated. Fortunately, the costs
incurred to train brand new navigators and pilots are available. Error! Reference source
not found. details these variable and fixed MPT costs according to Mr. Mark Parsons
from Headquarters Air Education and Training Command’s office of Financial
Management (2014, AETC). It is important to note that navigator initial qualification
training is conducted “in-house” at McConnell Air Force Base, and is therefore not
included in the AETC computation. At first glance, the cost of Specialized
Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) per pilot is about double the cost of primary
Combat Systems Officer (CSO) training, formerly known as Specialized Undergraduate
Navigator Training (SUNT). Strictly in terms of cost, it appears prudent to retain
navigators for as long as possible if required to replace them on a one-for-one basis.
Table 4. Initial Aircrew Training Costs Per Graduate
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Clearly the cost to train and equip a pilot is greater than for a navigator.
However, it is important to also investigate how the number of aircrew required is
determined in the first place and whether transitioning the SOAR mission from
navigators to pilots necessitates the same number of pilot replacements. These planning
factors are driven by information reported in the Status of Resources and Training
System.
Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)
AFI 10-201 requires measured units to report their readiness in terms of resources
and training. According to Major Paul Orth, “SORTS indicates a unit’s ability to undertake
its full wartime mission as defined in the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statement”
(2008). This DOC Statement is the source document which drives a unit’s resource and

training requirements and is either associated with Unit Type Codes (UTCs) or a Unit
Manning Document (UMD) to define manpower needs. On a monthly basis, a unit
assesses its ability to meet the capabilities outlined in the DOC Statement and reports an
overall category level to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff using the following
definitions outlined in Figure 2 (AFI 10-201 2013). Appendix A illustrates an example
DOC Statement.
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Figure 2. SORTS Category Levels
Ideally, a measured unit reports C-1, indicating it is capable of conducting all of
its tasked missions. However, in times of austerity this is often difficult to achieve. It is
even more difficult to maintain this capability during turbulent resource transitions and
acquisition beddown, which sometimes necessitates a C-5 assessment. While the overall
C-Level is relevant to the SOAR transition discussion, examining the structure of the
DOC Statement is more informative to illustrate the number of navigators, or their
replacements, required to accomplish the mission.
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A DOC Statement for a flying Wing is very specific in terms of personnel,
equipment, and training requirements, as well as normal and surge requirements for
aircraft generation. In order to determine how many aircrew positions are required to
accomplish the mission, two pieces of information are required: the number of
permanently assigned aircraft (PAA) and the crew ratio. Since a unit must account for
administrative requirements like temporary duties, leave, and sickness, the Major
Command determines an appropriate “crew ratio” for aircrew manning (Cole 1991). This
crew ratio is multiplied by the PAA and the crew complement to determine required
manning levels for each aircrew position.
In the DOC Statement for the 22d Air Refueling Wing (22 ARW), the unit solely
responsible for the KC-135 SOAR mission, SOAR crews are comprised of two pilots,
one navigator, and 1.25 boom operators. More specifically, for every four SOAR crews
assigned, the 22 ARW is authorized eight pilot, four navigator, and five boom operator
manning billets. The 22 ARW also has nuclear and traditional air refueling missions
which do not include a navigator in their crew complements. While the 22 ARW is
manned to meet maximum tasking requirements for all three of its designated missions, it
is extremely unlikely it would ever be tasked at maximum capacity for all three
simultaneously. Therefore, due to the significant number of pilots assigned to the wing to
accomplish all three of its missions, the required crew complement for pilots could
effectively remain the same, rather than increase, when the navigator requirement is
eliminated. In other words, flexibility allows for utilization of a pilot as a copilot one day
and a “third pilot” the next, or even as a copilot for a portion of a flight and a “third pilot”
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for another portion of the flight. The transition does not necessarily call for a one-for-one
navigator replacement, but an analysis of manpower utilization is beneficial to determine
the proper crew ratio.
Dynamic Manpower Reallocation
Decisions involving how best to structure units, balance levels of effort, and
maximize productivity often involve many variables, some measured objectively and
others derived subjectively. Lieutenant Colonel Brent French, a mobilization expert,
published an article titled “Decision Framework for Dynamic Manpower Reallocation”
which defines a manner in which to assess utilization of manpower across units. He
presents the decision framework as consisting of two dimensions: a utilization factor and
a utility function (2007, French). He then describes these two dimensions:
The utilization factor is used to develop a burden index, useful in
comparative analysis and answering the question, “Are some of my units
working disproportionately longer hours than others?” The utility function
then provides the commander the tools to decide, “Should I temporarily
augment an overused unit with manpower from an underused unit?” (2007).
More specifically, the utilization rate is defined as the percentage level of effort, where
0% means manpower present for duty completely fail to provide any work output while
100% indicates the maximum possible man-hour output with manpower available. The
utility factor, on the other hand, is defined as the mission impact of manpower
reallocation. While the utilization factor and utility function are associated with units in
this case, one can apply the framework to members within unit, as well, like pilots and
16

navigators. French suggests taking into consideration manpower available, the situation,
and the schedule to determine utilization factor. Table 5 illustrates calculations of
various utilization factors for several work schedules.
Table 5. Output and Utilization Factors for Various Schedules (2007, French)

The inputs determining utilization factor ultimately enable the calculation of a “burden
index” to recommend which units or personnel should be considered for reallocation
before determining the more subjective utility function (2007). Figure 3 plots these
burden indices to suggest which personnel should be considered for manpower
reallocation based on schedules in Table 5.
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Figure 3. Plot of Relative Burden Indices
Ultimately the utility function, or mission impact, is the overarching factor
driving the decision of whether or not to reallocation manpower. French keys in on three
variables which affect mission impact in terms of dynamic manpower reallocation: risk of
either leveling or not leveling manpower, transition burden, and duration. This decision
framework is illustrated in Figure 4, where “leveling” means balancing manpower across
units to yield equivalent workload (2007). While the risk of leveling relates to shortfalls
and loss of utility due to reallocation of personnel away from a unit, the risk of not
leveling accounts for the cost of not reallocating resources. Duration relates to how long
the reallocation is necessary, and the transition burden “considers the level of training
required, the periodicity of the training, the physical resources required to perform the
task, and the re-transition burden when the temporary duty is complete (2007).
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Figure 4. Dynamic Manpower Reallocation Decision Framework
One can apply the decision framework for dynamic manpower reallocation to the
restructuring of pilots in place of KC-135 navigators. In terms of the SOAR transition,
the risk of not leveling is the cost incurred by either not replacing navigators or by
delaying the transition. The risk of leveling is the utilization lost by reallocating pilots
away from traditional pilot duties when serving in the traditional SOAR navigator role.
The duration in this case is indefinite, and the transition burden encompasses all of the
training and resources required to develop a suitable SOAR navigator replacement.
Officer Development for Rated Air Force Navigators
As previously stated, the decision framework for manpower reallocation involves
the risk of not leveling as a critical decision variable; in other words, either not replacing
or delaying the replacement of navigators. A large component of this risk involves
officer development of navigators. Quite simply, the longer the Air Force waits to
transition the KC-135 navigator career field, the more likely the transition period will be
shortened. Since the Air Force’s assignment system relies on manning projections and
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specific positions becoming available at a steady pace, issues often arise when the system
is flooded in a short period of time, like when the Air Force eliminated over 200
navigators by the year 2000 because there were no suitable positions available (Deivert
1994). Thereafter, the Air Force is forced to either inefficiently eliminate rated officers,
in whom it has invested large sums of money for training, development, and experience,
or to stall careers due to lack of suitable assignments available. Arguably, the latter is
just as inefficient since it causes many officers to resign their commissions. Rebecca
Grant, president of IRIS Independent Research, stated, “Over the last 10 years, the
transition to a much smaller fleet with diverse taskings has turned rated management into
a roller coaster whose ups and downs affect the force for years to come” (2014).
Rated aircrew management, which includes pilots, navigators, and air battle
managers, seeks to meet current operational needs while building future leaders (Grant
2014). In order to build those future leaders, the Air Force postures experienced aviators,
defined as those who have attained over 500 flight hours, in management positions at the
Wing level and above (Grant 2014). Some of these coveted positions include staff billets
at major commands, combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the Pentagon, and at Air Force
Headquarters (Grant 2014). Due to additional supervisory staff and safety duties, Grant
estimates experienced aircrew should fill between 45% and 55% of a flying squadron’s
manning billets (2014).
Over 10 years ago, Air Force senior leadership identified that for some time
navigators were prevented from reaching their full career potential, and the lack of
navigators in the general officer ranks suggested their training programs were antiquated
20

(Chapman 2005). In other words, over time this out-of-date training led to devaluing of
the navigator crew position and decreased leadership development opportunities.
According to General Donald G. Cook, former Commander of Air Education and
Training Command, “We have for too long in our Air Force undervalued the potential
and the capability and the abilities of our navigators” (2005). Since current Air Force
navigators, or Combat Systems Officers, now experience a modernized training program,
it will be interesting to see if the trend senior leaders recognized 10 years ago continues,
and management of the KC-135 navigator transition will serve as a clear indicator.
The dilemma of career progression for Air Force navigators is not new. In fact, to
grasp a better idea of future command opportunities for navigators, taking a look at
historical observations indicates not much has changed. In 1989, Lieutenant Colonel
Larry Magnuson, a Master Navigator with over 3,000 flight hours, authored an Air War
College study titled “The Future of the Air Force Navigator.” He indicated command
opportunities exist, particularly within support squadrons, but the opportunities will only
persist if three factors hold true: “1) current trends toward navigator commanders
continue, 2) staff positions increase making the navigator more competitive for all
commander positions, and 3) the rated supplement opportunities increase providing
experience necessary to successfully compete for support commander positions”
(Magnuson 1989). The 2014 reduction in force significantly decreased staff
opportunities that must be manned with aircrew officers, called the rated supplement,
which certainly does not bode well for navigators. However, Lieutenant Colonel
Magnuson also remarked, “The path to promotion is an unidentifiable combination of
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promotions, command, high level staff positions, and timing” (1989). Further, he stated
the future of the Air Force navigator s directly affected by pilot manning, the rated
supplement, staff positions, and technological advancement of aircraft (1989).
While staff opportunities were significantly slashed in 2014, the proportion of
billets filled by navigators will remain strong if Air Force leadership decides to retain the
pool of experienced pilots in operational flying assignments to curtail hollow force
concerns. These troubles are alleviated by maintaining enough experience to properly
develop younger pilots. Additionally, a surge in commercial airline hiring may cause a
pilot shortage which frees available staff billets for navigators. The proportion of these
staff positions available is historically favorable to navigators. In 1993, 35% of
navigators held staff billets while only 24% of pilots served in staff capacities (Magnuson
1989).
Lieutenant Colonel Magnuson concluded his research of the future for Air Force
navigators with a proposal to create a navigator career monitor position. The
responsibilities of this position include compiling manpower statistics and liaising with
major commands, advocating for career development programs, and providing navigators
with education required to transition to alternate career paths in the Air Force (1989). In
fact, transition programs used to exist which enabled rated officers to maintain aircrew
currency while filling undermanned support positions in maintenance, security forces,
and logistics. Known as “Volant Wrench,” “Volant Cop,” “Volant Store,” and “Volant
Van,” these highly competitive programs enhanced both retainability and career
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development (Magnuson 1989). Considering the dire need for Air Force maintenance
officers, a program like “Volant Wrench” could not be more imperative.
Summary
The literature review investigated previous research related to management of
personnel and training associated with aircrew transition. It examined findings linked to
manpower divestment, skillset transition, and navigator officer development through
studies of major weapons system life cycle costs, readiness reporting, and a decision
framework for manpower reallocation. Additionally, a historical analysis of career
progression and command opportunities for rated navigators illustrated prolonged
challenges which persist today. This literature is critical to crafting informed decisions
which impact how and when KC-135 navigators are divested.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the Delphi process was applied in
order to solicit and organize results regarding the best ways to divest the KC-135
navigator force. Anonymity of selected experts for the study was critical to ensuring
data, opinions, and results were not skewed. Therefore, names, duty stations, job titles,
and ranks are omitted from this discussion.
Overview of Research Methodology
In order to apply the Delphi method, it was necessary to organize strict protocol
and structure. This involved a series of steps to formulate a framework. Ultimately, the
task at hand encompassed selection of experts, explanation of the topic and Delphi
process to those experts, formulation of questionnaires, feedback and re-questioning, and
compilation of results to formulate a group consensus. In terms of protocol, experts were
instructed to only communicate the results of their questionnaires through the study’s
facilitator, refrain from identifying themselves as part of the study, and abstain from
speaking with peers about their questionnaires. Structurally, all questionnaire responses
were transmitted only through the Delphi study facilitator, differing responses were
relayed between experts, and each expert was instructed his identity would permanently
remain anonymous.
The first and most important step was selection of key experts to participate in the
series of questionnaires. In order to elicit opinions and information without bias due to
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organization, rank, or position, these experts were well informed beforehand how the
process would unfold. They were informed their identities and any identifiable
information tied to them would remain confidential before, during, and after the research
study. Additionally, experts were not told who was involved in the study, were
encouraged not to discuss their involvement in the study, and were numbered in order to
maintain anonymity. By the end of the first step, five experts were chosen based on
breadth and depth of experience and knowledge and were assigned identifiers “Expert 1”
through “Expert 5.”
The second step of the study established a foundation of where each expert stood
by initiating the first round of questionnaires using the research questions in Table 3.
Deliberately, the questions were provided without any supporting data. This was
important in order to gather initial opinions from the experts before supplying further
information in follow-up questionnaires.
The third step of the study involved identification of varying answers from the
initial questionnaire, followed by consolidated feedback supported with factual data.
After each round of questionnaires, any questions with which a consensus was reached
would be pared out from future questionnaires in order to focus on arriving at
conclusions. While desirable to reach unanimous decisions for each of the investigative
questions, it was important to recognize the possibility one or more experts could
fervently disagree, regardless of how many rounds of questionnaires and feedback were
provided. In this case, after exhausting all means to reach compromise, the question
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would be omitted from further questionnaires and varying positions would be
incorporated in the study’s analysis and results.
The final step of the Delphi method for this research study entailed compiling all
of the expert opinions and data elicited through the sequence of questionnaires in order to
draw conclusions. Since many of the investigative questions involved subjective criteria,
it was important to document assumptions and limitations. The final recommendations
would ultimately encompass a collection of the best analysis agreed upon by the panel of
experts.
Assumptions
Application of the Delphi method to solicit ideas, information, and opinions from
the selected experts involves several assumptions. It is assumed that these participants
will provide their honest stances to the research questions without pressure to the
contrary based on their assigned organizations, ranks, or positions. Additionally, it is
reasonable to assume information may exist related to the investigative questions which
the selected experts cannot access or is classified in a manner in which restricts
disclosure. While robust feedback is desired for this investigative study, it is also
important to consider the limitation that expert subjects may fail to provide timely and
thorough analysis due to time constraints caused by their jobs.
Description of Analyses
Unlike studies which involve significant quantitative analyses through statistics,
modeling, simulations, and calculations, this study lends itself more toward the use of
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qualitative analysis. A key aspect of this analysis involves the relay of disagreement
between experts in order to request rebuttals and eventually arrive at a consensus. While
the experts may all quickly arrive at the same answer to a particular research question, it
is possible other questions will demand many rounds of questioning before reaching a
conclusion. In order to maintain objectivity and anonymity when gathering responses
and performing analyses, all responses were relayed verbatim between the experts, and
hand-written answers were transcribed into printed text. Additionally, the effect of
experts abandoning their opinions based on views of the majority was prevented by only
stating varying beliefs themselves, omitting how many experts offered the differing ideas.
Summary
This chapter described how the Delphi process was applied in order to request
information, analyze it, and arrive at conclusions for the most pragmatic methods for
divestment of the KC-135 navigator force. The selected experts remain anonymous
before, during, and after the study in order to prevent bias in data, opinions, and final
results. Therefore, identities of the panel of experts were omitted from the discussion.
This chapter further outlined the framework with which to question and re-question the
panel, discussed assumptions and limitations to the provided feedback, and described the
procedure for processing analysis. Careful adherence to the Delphi process methodology
guaranteed the following analysis in as meticulous and unbiased manner possible.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter describes and explains the analysis and results derived from a series
of questionnaires distributed to five experts through use of the Delphi method. Since this
study involved an extensive set of investigative questions in order to arrive at a
comprehensive solution to KC-135 navigator divestment, the results are organized one
question at a time. Chapter V conclusions and recommendations summarizes these
findings and prescribes the best way forward for the Air Force’s transition of the KC-135
SOAR program and its navigator corps.
Question 1. How should navigators be divested from the KC-135?
This question was the most debated of the investigative questions because it
concerned timeframe and rate at which navigators should be divested from the KC-135
community. Upon initial questioning, Expert 1 and Expert 4 suggested phase out occur
as close to KC-46 beddown as possible and at an aggressive pace. Expert 2, Expert 3,
and Expert 5 recommended halting the pipeline of brand new inbound Combat Systems
Officers and implementing third pilot SOAR training while divesting navigators through
normal attrition. Expert 5 furnished Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 as possible courses
of action. It is important to note Expert 5’s COAs made the assumption a pilot is the
most practical replacement to the navigator for the SOAR mission, though this
assumption is further explored in Question 3.
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Figure 5. Phased Divestment of KC-135 Navigators
The first Course Of Action (COA), initially recommended by Expert 5 generally
corroborated with the opinions of Expert 2 and Expert 3. Expert 5 asserted freezing new
inbounds prevented aviators from training on a MWS with limited development
opportunity, minimized operational risk to the SOAR mission transition otherwise
amplified by simultaneous transition to the KC-46, and established a reasonable timeline
for the Air Force to find new positions for existing navigators. This COA outlined a
Small Group Tryout (SGTO) before training pilots in the navigator’s duties and operating
in parallel until the completion of navigator divestment. Additionally, Expert 5
mentioned recoding some of the administrative UMD positions from navigator billets
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(12M3F) to pilot billets (11M3F) and decreasing the number of flying squadrons at
McConnell Air Force Base from four to three to eliminate excessive administrative
overhead.

Figure 6. Immediate Divestment of KC-135 Navigators
A second COA involved a more aggressive and immediate navigator divestment.
None of the experts deemed this COA prudent due to the risk involved in transitioning
SOAR too quickly, a likely scarcity of suitable assignment options in such a short
timeframe, and an expected failure to successfully persuade higher headquarters to adjust
the SOAR crew ratio. While this COA was unpopular among the experts, they all agreed
converting the six administrative UMD positions would maintain more flexibility when
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the suggested third pilot concept was fully implemented. Additionally, they agreed at the
completion of the transition deactivating a flying squadron was necessary to maintain
proper administrative complements. Expert 1 further noted that there is a plan to
deactivate one of the flying squadrons upon KC-46 beddown, regardless of navigator
divestment.

Figure 7. Divest KC-135 Navigators During KC-46 Beddown
The third COA described by Expert 5 was initially supported by Expert 1 and
Expert 4. This plan involved waiting until KC-46 beddown to phase out navigators and
transition the SOAR mission. Expert 1 and Expert 4 acknowledged an aggressive
transition might leave some navigators with limited career options. However, they
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claimed it was more costly for the Air Force to replace navigators with pilots. Though
navigators and pilots of the same rank and time in service are paid the same salary,
Expert 4 indicated the initial cost to train a pilot was double that of a navigator and
increased pilot requirements could additionally drive up flying hour costs. His
observation of initial training costs was roughly accurate according to Table 4Error!
Reference source not found.. Additionally, Expert 1 illustrated the history of significant
delays to MWS beddowns which he claimed further supported waiting to transition the
SOAR mission.
The main point of contention regarding whether to divest navigators sooner rather
than closer to KC-46 beddown revolved primarily around life cycle cost and partially
around development of those officers whose position would be eliminated. Through
subsequent re-questioning and supplying the experts with each other’s facts and opinions,
discussion advanced to new levels. The experts each expressed their viewpoints whether
the SOAR mission required a new pilot replacement for each navigator, if it mattered
how long it takes before KC-46 beddown, and the potential cost incurred by the Air Force
if navigators were left with few career options and underwent a Reduction In Force (RIF)
or resigned commissions after fulfilling their active duty service commitments.
Expert 2, Expert 3, and Expert 5 maintained their initial stance through requestioning and were adamant that earlier navigator divestment could take place at a
lower cost because a new pilot would not be required to replace each divested navigator.
In fact, Expert 2 stated the nature of McConnell Air Force Base as a super tanker Wing
with four flying squadrons enabled it to absorb the SOAR mission with already assigned
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personnel, regardless of whether six of the fifty navigator positions was converted to a
pilot billet. Furthermore, Expert 3 noted the loss of over forty navigators would easily
result in monetary savings, even with the cost of six additional pilots and associated
flying hour and MPT costs.
Expert 4 was eventually convinced it made fiscal sense to divest navigators
sooner rather than later, at which point he agreed to the COA for halting the inbound
pipeline and gradually transitioning SOAR. However, Expert 1 brought up the Wing’s
DOC statement and suggested it would drive a one-for-one navigator replacement. The
other experts conceded this was the case, as written, but claimed the DOC statement was
based on an old standard. A large personnel shift like divestment of an entire crew
position would dictate a new DOC statement, one with a crew ratio the other experts
declared would not require more pilots. While still somewhat unsure, Expert 1 ultimately
accepted it was possible to rewrite the DOC statement with a new crew ratio for the
SOAR mission and also acknowledged flooding the assignment system with too many
navigators all at once could lead to unintended consequences and a loss of experienced
human capital. Interestingly, though all five experts eventually supported the phased
divestment COA, their backgrounds did not appear to bias their initial opinions. Two
pilots and one navigator initially supported the COA in Figure 5 while one pilot and one
navigator initially supported the COA in Figure 7.
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Question 2. What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects after
navigators are phased out?
Answers to this question varied significantly but included more additive feedback
than disputes. In terms of manpower, the experts agreed the net loss of about one fourth
of the officers assigned to the 22d Operations Group meant one of the four flying
squadrons should be deactivated. Expert 3 indicated it would be difficult and inefficient
to maintain levels of management in four squadrons with such losses. Aside from flying
operations, officers hold key positions enabling training, readiness, standardization and
evaluation, tactics, scheduling, safety, and executive administrative support. The experts
agreed leveling manpower in an efficient manner necessitated operations with three
flying squadrons instead of four.
Another manpower consideration concerned changes to authorizations in support
roles. While the number of aircraft maintenance personnel is driven by the number of
permanently assigned aircraft at the installation, support personnel such as aviation
resource managers, intelligence operators, and aircrew flight equipment specialists are
driven in-part by utilization. Though a decrease in navigators signals decreased work
load for these personnel, Expert 5 suggested changes in UMD authorizations would be
marginal. Expert 1 agreed and proposed aviation resource managers would experience
the largest loss with the deactivation of a flying squadron.
Speaking to the personnel piece of MPT, Expert 4 asserted there should not be a
problem with personnel experience levels post-divestment as long as the distribution of
experienced pilots to inexperienced pilots remained healthy throughout the transition. In
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contrast to past Air Force personnel reductions where a disproportionate amount of
experienced aircrew were eliminated from the force, he pointed out how this divestment
eliminates all navigators, experienced and inexperienced alike. The end result would not
cause what is commonly referred to as the “bathtub” effect, where a shortage of
personnel with a specific specialty and expertise causes turbulent manpower hurdles for
years to come.
Expert 1 and Expert 3 stated training would experience the most significant
changes during and after navigator divestment. Most notably, the experts declared the
eventual shutdown of the navigator formal training unit, as well as contracted instruction
taught by KC-135 simulator specialists. Moreover, replacement of navigators called for
transition of SOAR training from instructor navigators to their replacements. Expert 2
suggested this transition would be easier than it sounded. Based on findings from a
February 2014 third pilot test case, which involved hands-on SOAR instruction for six
pilots by instructor navigators on several flights, he was confident a pilot’s undergraduate
training provided baseline knowledge which reduced the amount of training required. In
fact, Expert 2 affirmed training a new pilot in the SOAR mission would only require one
day of ground training and one hands-on flight. Furthermore, he advised third pilots,
presumably those with instructor qualification, could take over instruction of the course
with as little as 15 hours of SOAR flight experience. The other experts agreed with
Expert 2’s assertions with the exception of Expert 5, who summarily agreed but
suggested 15 hours of SOAR flight experience might be a little too aggressive.
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Question 3. What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the SOAR
mission? What are the cost implications?
Though all of the experts initially agreed based on the importance and complexity
of SOAR missions that an additional pilot was the most suitable navigator replacement,
Expert 5 thought it was important to additionally discuss the options of communications
systems operators (specialty code X3D1X3) and KC-135 boom operators (specialty code
1A0X1). He supplied data from AMC which scored ground and flight capabilities for
alternatives to the SOAR navigator found in Figure 8 and Figure 9.

Figure 8. AMC SOAR Ground Duty Scoring
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Figure 9. AMC SOAR Flight Duty Scoring
While AMC’s scoring agreed with initial assertions that a pilot was the most
appropriate navigator replacement, the experts believed AMC’s scoring was biased and
vastly underestimated training already incorporated in the pilot program such as radar
operation, rendezvous, flight planning, and expertise required for staff positions. Expert
3 ran separate scoring at the Operations Group level against pilot training syllabi and
furnished ground and flight capability assessments illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
The new scoring largely validated scoring of the communications specialists and boom
operators but more remarkably illustrated a disparity in AMC’s assessment of pilot
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abilities versus the Operations Group’s judgment. The other experts accepted Expert 3’s
scoring as a more appropriate valuation of navigator replacement aptitude.

Figure 10. OG SOAR Ground Duty Scoring
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Figure 11. OG SOAR Flight Duty Scoring
The experts questioned reached a consensus that communications specialists
lacked requisite airmanship and boom operators required substantial additional training to
fulfill the navigator’s role in the SOAR mission. Despite the significant cost savings of
replacing navigators with enlisted operators, the experts agreed these options could not
ultimately accomplish SOAR mission requirements. Therefore, the focus of cost shifted
toward comparing the present cost of navigator employment with the potential cost of
pilot replacements. Expert 1 furnished an annual estimate for 2015 as shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Annual Aircrew Cost Estimate

In Table 6, Expert 1 explained several assumptions were employed to generate a
basis from which to compare average costs for navigators and pilots. Of note, estimates
were based on an aircrew member with an average experience level as a Captain with six
years of commissioned service and four years of aviation service. Additionally, initial
training costs took into account the average annual costs of undergraduate pilot and
navigator training from Table 4 spread across the associated service commitment
durations, six years for navigators and ten years for pilots. Since Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) flight hours are programmed based on the flight time required to
train pilots annually, this additional cost was added for each pilot; navigators do not incur
this cost since their training is not a limiting factor and is accomplished utilizing already
programmed O&M flight hours. The other experts agreed the estimates in Table 6 were
based on reasonable assumptions. They indicated the COA which recodes six pilots into
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navigator positions would save the Air Force about $6.5 million annually. Additionally,
not accounting for the opportunity costs from failing to retain navigators post-divestment,
these estimates suggest about 44 pilots could replace the 50 navigators for the same cost.
Question 4. What changes are required to Air Force regulations to transition the
SOAR mission?
All experts agreed after Air Force level approval of reassignment of navigator
SOAR duties to a suitable replacement, changes to regulations would follow suit
relatively quickly and easily. Expert 3 noted the three parent Air Force Instructions
(AFI) which delineated SOAR navigator training, evaluation, and flight duties: AFI 112KC-135 Volume 1, AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 2, and AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3.
While he didn’t believe it was beneficial to the discussion to examine each of the
multitude of navigator AFI references, he summarized key concepts from the three
primary AFIs.
In AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 1, Expert 3 suggested pilots already accomplish the
continuation training required for navigators, and the only additional training reference
involved SOAR. He indicated the AFI organizes navigator training into three phases:
basic navigator, SOAR navigator, and instructor navigator. Of these phases, Expert 3
stated the basic navigator and instructor navigator phases could be removed entirely after
SOAR transition, and the SOAR navigator phase would be modified for the pilot’s needs
along with associated Chapter 4 ground and continuation training requirements. The
section defining the SOAR navigator phase is depicted in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. SOAR Navigator Training Phase (11-2KC-135V1)
The experts agreed AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 2, would be the simplest to update.
Expert 3 plainly stated Chapter 3, the instructions regarding navigator evaluations, could
be removed. Since SOAR is a certification rather than a qualification, its requirements
are not evaluated per Chapter 3. Expert 2 identified two evaluation criteria specific to
navigators in which pilots are not evaluated: manual gear extension and manual flap
extension (AFI 11-2KC-135V2 2010). However, those capabilities were only required
for initial basic navigator or initial instructor evaluations and are already evaluated for
boom operators. All experts agreed it was not necessary to levy these evaluation criteria
on navigator replacements.
The third AFI referenced by Expert 3 regarded KC-135 Operations Procedures in
AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3. The section defining the navigator’s role was incorporated
in the KC-135 aircrew complement. Figure 13 shows how the four-person crew is
defined for the SOAR mission and outlines in 6.60.4 the duties which would presumably
be performed by a third pilot replacement.
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Figure 13. KC-135 Aircrew Complement (11-2KC-135V3, 124-125)
Expert 5 additionally mentioned AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3, Addenda C, which
specifically defines SOAR procedures. Distribution of the Addenda C is limited to those
read into the SOAR program, but updating it to account for a replacement to the
navigator would only involve substituting references to the navigator with references to
the new operator. All of the experts agreed this contextual crew position name
replacement was the fundamental modification for each of the AFIs.
Question 5. How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be restructured
to support the new SOAR construct?
This question generated the quickest consensus. Upon initial questioning, each of
the experts suggested the UMD was more driven by the DOC statement’s crew ratio
requirements than anything else. Therefore, any changes to the DOC statement due to
navigator divestment would drive UMD changes. However, in the Question 1 discussion
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of the best courses of action for SOAR transition, the experts all agreed recoding
administrative navigator positions in the UMD would slightly increase the flexibility of
pilot replacements when navigator elimination was complete. These administrative
positions, often referred to as “attached” positions, create billets for aviators but are not
considered line flyers. In other words, the attached positions are filled over and above
DOC statement requirements. While only a minor explicit change, the experts reached a
consensus that six administrative positions held by navigators existed which would be
suitable pilot positions after SOAR transition. These UMD authorizations coded with a
navigator 12M3F AFSC would be changed to a pilot 11M3F AFSC.
Question 6. How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR certified?
Answers to this question initially varied significantly. Expert 2 and Expert 3
broadly stated navigator replacements should attend formal certification course
conducted exclusively by the 22d Operations Group SOAR staff unit, including both
ground and flight training. Expert 1 did not initially weigh in on who would conduct the
instruction, but believed the training was best conducted using home station weekly
SOAR training flights rather than on biannual multi-lateral training exercises. He
debated that SOAR instruction would better be retained on home-station missions rather
than at off-station exercises due to the familiar mission planning experience.
Expert 4 presented the navigator SOAR certification syllabus, roughly consisting
of one duty day of ground training followed by one flight, and suggested applying the
same syllabus to navigator replacements. He additionally suggested it did not matter
whether flights were conducted at home station or abroad. Since the program would be
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structured with training folders and organized with specific instruction points other flying
certification programs, replacements would be held accountable for attaining all requisite
SOAR expertise.
Expert 5 agreed with Expert 4, further stating off-station SOAR exercises usually
offered many flights over a period of weeks which might actually present more robust
training through repetition and achieving more than the syllabus requires. Also, Expert 5
offered the most comprehensive training plan, including when to transition instruction of
the program from navigators to trained third pilot replacements. Though notional, Table
7 illustrates Expert 5’s suggestion for training navigator replacements and eventually
transitioning control of instruction to those replacements.
Table 7. Navigator Replacement Training Timeline

He noted this timeline was based on home station training flights alone since off station
exercises occur roughly twice a year but not according to a predictable timeline. He said
training flights take place approximately twice per week but a maximum of 18 trained
replacements was reasonable when considering cancelled flights due to weather or
maintenance and extra flights for students failing to grasp the instruction in a timely
manner. Additionally, Expert 5 suggested training fewer students at first, presumably
initial replacement cadre, then allowing them to gain SOAR experience for two quarters
before gradually introducing them as instructors and phasing out navigator instructors.
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By the end of the discussion on how to train and certify navigator replacements,
Expert 2 and Expert 3 reached a consensus with the other experts that the existing
navigator SOAR syllabus could be applied to navigator replacements. They agreed
Expert 5’s timeline sounded reasonable but would probably require real-time
adjustments. Also, they concluded it made sense to maximize instruction by utilizing
both home station flights and off-station exercises to meet syllabus requirements.
Finally, the experts reached a compromise on who should train replacements. Whereas
Expert 2 and Expert 3 wanted all instruction originating from the 22d Operations Group
SOAR unit, the other experts believed the unit was too small to handle the volume of
instruction necessary and all instructors across the flying squadrons should also be
employed. The solution reached involved relying on the specialized SOAR training unit
as much as possible throughout the transition but specifically for the initial non-navigator
replacement cadre.
Question 7. How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators from
various year groups? Where will they go? How will they accrue gate months?
Expert 1 initially stated he thought the majority of navigators would be reassigned
to fly special operations aircraft, specifically the U-28 and AC-130, depending on how
many years of experience they had accrued in the KC-135. However, Expert 3 rebutted
with further information that though there was a manning need within special operations
over the past several years, many of those positions were filled by transitioning C-130
legacy navigators and the need had been satisfied. However, the projected shortage
resided within the B-52 community. While these two experts discussed specific job
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openings for the majority of divested navigators, the other three experts spoke more
broadly regarding career timing and exhausting all assignment opportunities.
Experts 2, 4, and 5 centered the discussion on gate months, the minimum number
of months serving in an operational flying billet required to maintain Aviation Career
Incentive Pay (ACIP). Primarily, those navigators who had not yet served eight years of
operational flying would not continue to receive ACIP through 18 years of service if
reassigned to a non-operational flying position. Those more senior Captains and Majors
who had fulfilled the first 96-month flying gate would likely find themselves
transitioning to staff positions and would never return to flying again while the younger
navigators would retrain on another aircraft or fill positions allowing them to earn their
ACIP. Despite saving the Air Force a significant sum of money by prohibiting some
navigators from attaining the 96-month flying gate, the service risks retaining many of
these officers due to demands in the private sector for their training and aviation
experience. This is especially true for pilots, and the Air Force has traditionally enabled
aviators to meet this ACIP milestone in order to maintain operationally savvy personnel
and fill rated supplement requirements.
After exhausting the flying gate discussion, all of the experts agreed there were
many operational flying possibilities available to the younger navigators, all of which
they thought should be sought after to efficiently and effectively divest the force. While
the sharper experienced navigators could compete for undergraduate flying training
programs to become pilots or fly unmanned aircraft, the remainder of the experienced
instructors would most likely fill openings as CSO instructors at Naval Air Station
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Pensacola, and some would become Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO). The
younger navigators had fewer options and would transition to fill needs in other aircraft
such as the B-52, RC-135, MC-130, AC-130, and U-28. Although there is a projected
need for B-52 navigators in the coming years, there are several ways AFPC could
apportion KC-135 navigators, including double-billeting UMD authorizations in one or
more of the aforementioned aircraft until manning stabilizes or retaining them in the
tanker until there are manning vacancies.
Aside from the flying gate milestone delineating those navigators who would
never fly again from those who would be retrained, the experts cautioned reassignment of
too many navigators in a short timeframe. They suggested attrition at a conservative pace
in order to allow time for suitable openings to present themselves and make appropriate
personnel pairings. Additionally, the experts reached a consensus cautioning application
of a divestment plan which would leave navigators all undergoing reassignment at the
same time. Such a scenario, they warned, would likely cause AFPC to inefficiently force
shape a significant number of navigators out of the Air Force. In other words, while
personnel typically remain on a “Vulnerable to Move List” until AFPC can match them
to an assignment, if the Air Force waits too long to divest navigators, then the KC-46
could complete its beddown and eliminate all funded navigator billets. If a large number
of KC-135 navigators still exists at this point, the Air Force’s hand would likely be forced
to eliminate personnel rather than pay officers without jobs to perform.
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Summary
Applying the Delphi method to elicit information regarding navigator divestment
spurred on a great deal of debate and discussion. Though there was potential for ardent
disagreement and diverging ideas, largely the experts challenged and strengthened one
another’s ideas to arrive at shared conclusions. The greatest debate involved the best
COA for navigator divestment and ultimately supported closing the pipeline of inbound
navigators, a phased divestment with normal attrition, and recoding administrative
navigator positions to pilot billets. The experts also collectively agreed pragmatic
navigator divestment called for the deactivation of one flying squadron and believed a
pilot was the most suitable navigator replacement. Finally, they concluded AFI
modification was relatively trivial, standing up a SOAR transition certification program
was straightforward and attainable, and assignments exist for all navigators, as long as
the attrition timeline is adequate.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
KC-135 Navigator Divestment Using the Delphi Method
The Delphi process proved successful as a method to elicit information from a
panel of subject matter experts without pressure to accept one another’s viewpoints. It
broke down complex decisions involving both objective and subjective criteria in order to
make important decisions and arrive at well-informed conclusions. While the determined
results largely supported the initial hypotheses, the investigative questions stimulated
discussion and produced much more in-depth and fact-based rationale to support the
initial premise than expected. The following conclusions summarize the findings of
those research questions.
Summary of Research Questions and Answers
Answer to Question 1. How should navigators be divested from the KC-135?
Experts ultimately supported a COA which halts the pipeline and permanent
change of station of inbound navigators as soon as possible, deactivates one of the four
McConnell Air Force Base flying squadrons, introduces a SOAR transition program, and
reassigns presently assigned navigators through normal attrition and retraining. The
panel also agreed it was necessary to reexamine the DOC Statement and adjust the crew
ratio to account for the navigator divestment. Finally, the experts suggested recoding six
staff UMD billets from navigator positions to pilot positions in order to maintain critical
administrative functions.
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Answer to Question 2. What are potential manpower, personnel, and training effects
after navigators are phased out?
The panel believed manpower would see the greatest effect due to navigator
divestment. Specifically, they asserted deactivation of one flying squadron as the
appropriate COA to efficiently reorganize the flying units after the loss of 50 officers.
Though they believed manpower losses to support personnel would be minimal, loss of a
flying squadron would primarily reduce aviation resource management personnel. In
terms of personnel effects, the effects would be minimal since officers of all ranks and
experience levels would be eliminated equally. Finally, the training effects involved
included the eventual shutdown of the navigator Formal Training Unit, as well as its
associated contracted simulator instruction, and the standup of a SOAR transition training
program to transfer control of the mission to navigator replacements.
Answer to Question 3. What is the most feasible replacement for navigators in the
SOAR mission? What are the cost implications?
The panel agreed a pilot is the most feasible replacement for the navigator. While
cheaper, they concluded communications specialists and boom operators do not have the
requisite training to effectively take on the SOAR mission. One expert estimated the
replacement of navigators with pilots saves approximately $6.5 million annually.
Answer to Question 4. What changes are required to Air Force regulations to
transition the SOAR mission?
Among the AFIs which require modification are AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 1, AFI
11-2KC-135 Volume 2, and AFI 11-2KC-135 Volume 3, as well as its associated
Addenda C. In addition to replacing references to navigators with references to their
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replacements, the expert panel recommended removing basic navigator and instructor
navigator training phases from Volume 1, while redefining the SOAR certification
program. In Volume 2, all references to navigator evaluation criteria must be removed.
Lastly, Volume 3 requires new explanation of the crew complement to account for
elimination of navigators and necessity of a fourth crew member on SOAR missions.
Answer to Question 5. How will the Unit Manning Document (UMD) need to be
restructured to support the new SOAR construct?
Quite simply, the consensus reached indicated most changes to the UMD are
driven by DOC Statement crew ratio and PAA amendments. The only changes due to
restructuring of the SOAR program involve recoding critical staff positions previously
assigned to navigators. These six billets must change from 12M3F to 11M3F AFSCs.
Answer to Question 6. How will navigator replacements be trained and SOAR
certified?
The experts agreed navigator replacements needed initial instruction to earn
SOAR certification but additionally would have to eventually take over the certification
program themselves. They eventually reached agreement that the 22d Operations Group
SOAR unit would begin instructing navigator replacements and would subsidize with
outside help from flying squadron instructors. After approximately six months gaining
SOAR experience, navigator replacements would begin taking over instruction duties
alongside the navigator instructors who would be phased out by the end of two years.
This instruction would take place on both home station training missions and off-station
exercises with a goal of eventually training about 18 navigator replacements each quarter.
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Answer to Question 7. How will the assignment system handle KC-135 navigators
from various year groups? Where will they go? How will they accrue gate months?
It was agreed that the assignment system could not efficiently and effectively
handle reassignment of all KC-135 navigators at once. However, over a period of time
several options exist including attending undergraduate flying training, becoming an Air
Mobility Liaison Officer, instructing CSOs at the Formal Training Unit, retraining on
other aircraft, or transitioning to staff or other non-operational specialties. While many
of these options allow for younger navigators to continue accruing gate months to earn
ACIP, the older navigators most likely would discontinue aviation service and transition
to staff roles or other non-aviation specialties.
Study Limitations
Some of the limitations of this study included restricted access to strategic
planning information at the Air Force level, limited knowledge of AFPC manpower
forecasts, and lack of control over already programmed budgetary decisions affecting
personnel decisions. While the aforementioned solutions offer a comprehensive
approach to efficient reallocation of KC-135 navigators, it is possible these
recommendations could result in unintended consequences due to personnel divestment
on other major weapons systems and higher level long term plans. Considering 2014
AFPC force reductions, especially among staff positions, fewer options may exist for
reallocation of aircrew. This study was conducted independent of findings related to the
introduction of the KC-46 Pegasus. It is possible, however, that the Air Force possesses
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other informed plans which link navigator divestment to the KC-46 beddown timeline,
despite assertions it would only impose greater risk to the SOAR mission. Since an
expert from AFPC was not involved in the Delphi study for this thesis, it is possible
additional data exists which would better inform navigator divestment decisions.
Recommendations for Action
Based on this research, the Air Force should consider discontinuing the
assignment of KC-135 Navigators to McConnell Air Force Base as soon as possible and
initiate transition of the SOAR mission to pilots. Additionally, the 22d Operations Group
should deactivate one flying squadron, recode the UMD to retain administrative
capabilities, request an appraisal of the DOC statement, and begin the process of
proposing revisions to Air Force regulations and requesting manning projections from
AFPC. If the Air Force waits too long to divest the navigator corps, it could drive
inefficient personnel reductions rather than carefully planned ways to capitalize on
already trained and experienced aircrew investments.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research incited many ideas for future research. Among them are studies on
the relationship between manning and tasking of units with multiple mission sets, further
research on how best to efficiently divest aircrew, efficacy of manpower reallocation and
retraining programs, and minimizing redundant processes in Air Force “super” wings. In
order to study the relationship between manpower allocations and tasking, there is much
to learn from how the Commanders Apportionment and Allocation Plan (CAAP)
accounts for units with multiple mission sets or unique differences between aircraft units
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which should drive tasking considerations. For instance, while the SORTS is strictly a
readiness reporting tool, is it reasonable to consider this readiness system when
accounting for the CAAP? Further, it is beneficial to study units whose formal training
units are collocated with its operational units since a significant amount of its resources
are either in training or conducting instruction for that training.
Another recommendation for future research involves further study into how the
Air Force divests personnel, especially aircrew in whom it has invested substantial
resources training. It may be necessary to study the relationship between aircrew
divestment and the ever-repeating force reductions and growth. Colonel John Wissler
suggests the military appropriately prioritizes defense capability over efficiency when he
states, “Warfare is an endeavor of absolutes, and the absolute requirement is mission
effectiveness” (2009). To this end, further research might investigate proper balance of
capability and cost and at what point manpower reductions become a defense capability
problem.
This research alluded to former manpower reallocation and retraining programs
like the Volant Wrench, Volant Cop, Volant Store, and Volant Van programs which
retrained aviators into career fields with severe manning shortages. One might suggest
either reactivation of these programs or studies into new programs which would address
current Air Force needs. Such studies could also identify innovative ways to streamline
the Air Force budget by retraining and reallocating human capital in order to increase the
ability to recapitalize the fleet and invest in next generation defense acquisitions.
Lastly, as the Air Force Chief of Staff calls for new ideas to streamline the force
without sacrificing capabilities, further research into minimizing redundant processes is
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imperative. One such study might conduct manpower studies at bases with multiple
squadrons of identical personnel authorizations. This research recommended
deactivating one of the 22d Operations Group’s four flying squadrons. However, it
stopped short of examining the most efficient unit manning makeup. Each of the flying
squadrons in this case provides identical training, scheduling, readiness, tactics, and
safety processes, but further research could identify whether unit consolidation would
decrease overall workload. Since this thesis offered a comprehensive approach to
manpower divestment, it uncovered a myriad of potential subjects for future research.
Significance of Research
This thesis applied data and expert opinions to determine the most pragmatic way
to divest KC-135 SOAR navigators. Most significantly, the conclusions of the panel of
experts queried supported the hypothesis that current Air Force plans to continue minting
KC-135 navigators through Fiscal Year 2017 are inefficient, problematic, and
operationally risky. Further, the recommended courses of action offered an avenue to
both effectively transfer operational capabilities for the KC-135’s most complex mission
and save costs while preserving development and employment of skilled and experienced
aviators. How the Air Force continues to either promote or stifle the careers of
navigators will send a clear message to Air Force CSOs and could pose future retention
problems if it continues to repeat past personnel management mistakes.
This research also offers significant findings through its approach. Dynamic
manpower decisions do not take place in a vacuum, and reliance upon multiple experts to
formulate long term, sensible plans is fundamental to effective management of United
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States defense forces. Too often the Air Force appears to take a reactive approach to
budgetary constraints rather than a proactive approach. This research illustrates
application of a systems approach to thinking essential to formulation of proactive
strategies. While the topic of discussion in this case was a navigator, an element of the
KC-135 Major Weapon System, thorough study of a system’s or mission’s requirements,
needs, and capabilities is necessary to ongoing management throughout its life cycle.
This study’s systems approach successfully applied the Delphi process to reveal potential
divestment missteps and offer efficient, innovative, and comprehensive solutions.
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Appendix A. Sample DOC Statement (AFI 10-201)
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